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SUMMARY
The article discusses the role of precedents in the German judicial practice. In the European 
continental tradition, law enactment is within the legislature, whereas the role of the judiciary is to 
enforce law. In the continental system, precedent does not constitute a source of law sensu stricto, 
that is, a formal source of law. In order to guarantee the law utility and, ultimately, the legal certainty, 
courts interpret legal provisions in a unified manner. It is noteworthy that during the recent years the 
coherent interpretation of legal provisions and, by the same token, the commitment to law develop-
ment, have increased. That means that a unified interpretation of law performed by courts may be 
considered a precedent. In this context, precedents and stare decisis have been replacing the logical 
interpretation of law in German courts.
Keywords: precedent; legal certainty; German legal system; legal method; interpretatio logica
INTRODUCTION
This article deals with the question about the role of precedents in German 
legal practice. Formally seen – since doctrines of precedent and of stare decisis are 
not available – the answer for German law must be plainly negative. In European 
continental tradition, the production of law is in the competence of the legislative 
power while judicial power is dedicated to apply of the law1. Obviously, however, 
the legislative power may not and cannot regulate any single issue of the economy, 
1 In C. Montesquieu, De L’esprit des lois, Vol. XI, Ch. 6, the judge appears as the “bouche qui 
prononce les paroles de la loi”.
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the society, of the world for all individual cases. More general rules are the answer if 
not the notion prevails that abstraction is a predicate of rules as such. Consequently, 
the question arises for legal certainty and equity in applying the law2. A doctrine 
of precedents is no solution in continental context, resting in a hybrid state of an 
informal source of law3. Consequently, in continental tradition, the solution was 
a precise method of interpreting legal rules as applied by national courts in order 
to achieve uniform interpretation of the law and – ultimately – legal certainty4. The 
details about the way to reach this goal might differ substantially between the EU 
member states about the issue of interpreting national and European enactments 
by the courts. Furthermore, the matter of uniform interpretation of the law is of 
crucial importance in respect of functionality and efficiency of any judicial system. 
This is to say that in continental context the question for the scope and validity of 
a theory of precedents5 refers to the question for the legal method.
In Germany, the jurisdiction of the grand chamber of the Supreme Court (BGH) 
relates to legal method insofar as problems of uniform interpretation and (judge-
made) development of the law are concerned6. In this respect, the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court guarantees a definite degree of legal certainty and equal treatment 
of similar cases. Furthermore, the topic of consistent interpretation sheds some light 
onto the role of national supreme courts in their relationship with the European 
Court in general7.
“Legal certainty” may deem to be the product of uniform interpretation of the 
law achieved through the application of the principle of equality. Precedents are 
considered in the light of legal method employed by the constitutionally determined 
function of the judicial power, while they are not determined to be a formal source 
of law. However, precedents may provide a kind of authoritative example of correct 
2 The notion of certainty relates to precedents, cf. R. Cross, Precedent in English Law, Oxford 
1977, p. 108, 134.
3 H. Fenge, Der Richterspruch als Rechtsquelle, [in:] International Legal Studies, ed. B.H. 
Oppermann, Bd. 1, Halle 2009, p. 109; F. Müller, R. Christensen, Juristische Methodik, Bd. 1, Berlin 
2009, p. 539; W.R. Schluep, Einladung zur Rechtstheorie, Bern 2008, Rn 2475–2516.
4 L. Bach, L., Répertoire de droit civil, Paris 2009, § 36; M. Gobert, La jurisprudence source 
de droit triomphante mais menancée, RTD (1992) civ. 344; J. Esser, Grundsatz und Norm in der 
richterlichen Fortbildung des Privatrechts, Tübingen 1974; D. Simon, Die Unabhängigkeit des 
Richters, Darmstadt 1975, p. 68.
5 Vice versa, for the common law context, the answer might be different, cf. R. Cross, op. cit. 
For another view, cf. K.N. Llewellyn, The Normative, the Legal, and the Law Jobs: The Problem of 
Juristic Method, 49 Yale L.J. (1940), p. 1355.
6 § 132 Abs. 4 GVG.
7 Cf., e.g., G.C.R. Iglesias, Der EuGH und die Gerichte der Mitgliedstaaten – Komponenten der 
richterlichen Gewalt in der Europäischen Union, NJW 2000, 1889; K.-H. Ladeur, Richterrecht und 
Dogmatik – eine verfehlte Konfrontation?, KritV 1996, p. 77; F. Müller,  R. Christensen, Juristische 
Methodik, Bd. 2, Berlin 2003, pp. 359–415.
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interpretation of a statue. Further emphasis be spent on the question as to whether 
or not the application of private law of European origin by national courts has 
additional impact on uniform interpretation.
THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY AND LEGAL CERTAINTY
To the principle of equality is bequeathed the necessity of uniform interpretation 
and application of the law8. In Germany, the guarantee of legal certainty counts as 
a fundamental constitutional principle9, which has been established by the courts 
in the way of pursuing a uniform method in the actual application of the rules. Le-
gal certainty is, together with the guarantee of substantive justice, one of the two 
component parts of the principle of the due course of law10. At the same time, it is 
a procedural objective11. Since the aim of substantial justice in individual cases and 
the guarantee of legal certainty can oppose each other, it may well be observed that 
this conflict is resolved in favour of legal certainty, means rather for the sake of the 
judicial system as a whole than for justice in an individual case. Legal certainty is 
a concept of legal policy, which taken by itself signifies nothing: only in the context 
of a constitutionally recognised order does it become a requirement to achieve the 
utmost clarity and rationality in the decision-making process.
The judiciary obtains that legitimacy so characteristic of any democratic state 
by the way in which judicial decisions are bound to the letter of the law. However, 
this observation does not reach very far, for the binding nature of both written and 
unwritten law (e.g., precedent) also encompasses the jurisdiction of the courts as 
to statutory interpretation and the further development of the law. In the words of 
the German Constitutional Court, a judge is bound by both the written as well as 
the unwritten law in order to guard against a too narrow positivistic approach being 
adopted: “Out of the positive rules of public authorities, there can occasionally arise 
an overabundance of law which has its source in the constitutional order taken in 
its entirety and may be seen to operate as a corrective to the written law; to find 
this is the task of the courts”12. The concept of a judge being bound only to the 
letter of the law presupposes the completeness of any positive legal order; in other 
8 Cf. R. Cross, op. cit.; N. MacCormick, Z. Bankowski, On Method and Methodology, [in:] Inter-
preting statutes. A Comparative Study, ed. N. MacCormick, Aldershot–Brookfield 1991 (1996), p. 9.
9 Article 20 Abs. 3 GG – cf. BVerfG 34, 269, 278 Soraya; BVerfGE 66, 116, 138 Walraff.
10 BVerfG 34, 269, 278 Soraya. Cf. P. Badura, Staatsrecht, München 2015, Nr. D 50; Kommentar 
zum Grundgesetz, Hrsg. B. Schmidt-Bleibtreu, H. Hoffmann. H.-G. Henneke, Köln 2017, Article 
20 Rn 57.
11 A. Baumbach, W. Lauterbach, J. Albers, P. Hartmann, Zivilprozessordnung: ZPO, München 
2017, Einl. III Rn 43.
12 BVerfGE 34, 269, 287 Soraya.
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words, a solely theoretical situation. Although a judge must refrain from acting in 
an arbitrary fashion, it nevertheless remains his duty to bring full expression to the 
values represented in the constitutional order. In so doing he is expected to both 
recognise and evaluate the same which activity need not lack elements of his will 
as an individual. That a judge should be so given to creatively develop the law in 
such a way has never been contested13.
LEGAL SYSTEM AND LEGAL METHOD
The demands for legal certainty and equality before the law would seem to 
largely remain unfulfilled. Not only within the scope of indeterminate legal con-
cepts, or when closing so-called loopholes in the law, but also where statutory texts 
are clearly expressed is there a great deal of judicial activity involving freedom 
of interpretation as well as entailing rapid developments in the law. For example, 
in the law of unfair competition, the dynamics and diversity of all conceivable 
situations are so great, that it has always been difficult to find clearly definable 
groups of cases conforming with the requirements of legal certainty, even where the 
courts’ jurisdiction is exclusively case-related14. In addition, certain procedural court 
practices provide further potential for conflict-solving strategies15. For this reason, 
commentaries for the classification of case material are available16. Continental 
legal systems are not familiar with the Anglo-American common law concepts of 
binding precedent and stare decisis17. Alone the reference to the Anglo-American 
system does not lead one much further because continental judge-made law does 
not offer a comparable measure of certainty. In any case, there is at least even here 
the tendency to examine precedents when forming concrete rules of law and not 
to deviate from them without valid reason.
It is debatable whether this widely held opinion should be accepted in the 
light of the above-outlined constitutional principle. Might it not rather be the case 
that the traditional tenets of juridical thinking are so inseparably linked with the 
postulate of legal certainty, that only a systematically strict foundation on which 
to base a statement of reasons is justified. From the point of view of any individual 
13 Cf. ibidem, 286.
14 W. Hefermehl, Rechtsfortbildung im Wettbewerbsrecht, [in:] Richterliche Rechtsfortbildung, 
Hrsg. G. Reinhart, Heidelberg 1986, p. 331; O.F.F. von Gamm, Richterliche Rechtsfortbildung, 323, 
[in:] ibidem, p. 619.
15 B. Oppermann, Unterlassungsanspruch und materielle Gerechtigkeit, Tübingen 1993.
16 For the law of unfair competition ref. H.-J. Ahrens, Der Wettbewerbsprozess, Köln 2005, Einl. 
11; H. Köhler, J. Bornkamm, UWG, München 2017, Einl. UWG 2.4., 2.42 and passim.
17 For comparative studies on legal method, cf. N. MacCormick, Z. Bankowski, op. cit., passim.
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subjected to the processes of law, the question is quite simply reduced to knowing 
how the judge will decide the case.
In other words, those requirements – which are essential when pronouncing 
actual legal rules – must be clearly recognisable. Legal method will be thereby 
advanced18. However, the existence of a legal method that is universally valid 
has, from the perspective of legal theory, become doubtful19. The original problem 
centred on the conditions under which the production of law can be legitimately 
described as “proper” law. Later concerns reflected the conceivability of the unity 
and autonomy of any legal system, before moving on to consider the role of lan-
guage and logic in legal argumentation or rather reasoning. Taken over a reasonably 
measurable period of time, no lasting satisfactory solution has been found20.
The policy concepts of legal certainty have therefore assumed divergent, partly 
antithetical tasks. In an ideal condition, absolute certainty of the law would no 
longer be at disposal – the elements of any given system are completely fixed: there 
are no more degrees of freedom21. This supposition would not be suitable for an 
analysis of concrete legal phenomena. Indeed, the legal concept of certainty does 
not suggest determinacy. Individuals or groups need the certainty and rationality 
of the law when attempting thereby to diminish their own risks owing to the fact 
that they are actually reducing their freedom of disposition in certain areas, e.g., 
through contractual stipulation. New kinds of options have themselves given rise 
to new uncertainties, which in turn have to be overcome so that “certainty” may 
rightly become an element of the dynamics of social change. Thereby it may be 
a paradox since the reflexivity of law together with legal certainty occasioned 
themselves to produce by their very nature uncertainty. This will lead in turn to 
uncertainty because the “securing of certainty” lies in the making available of 
legally institutionalised options and not in the direct and strict observance of the 
integrity of any particular object of legal protection. Such deliberations call for 
a further restriction: on the analysis of real connections between legal actions, the 
assumption of absolute certainty in law results in a paradox. In order to deal with 
uncertainty about future eventualities, just the probability of being able to predict 
the outcome of decisions is sufficient.
18 BVerfG 34, 269, 278 Soraya; BVerfGE 66, 116, 138 Walraff.
19 B. Rüthers, C. Fischer, A. Birk, Rechtstheorie, München 2015, §§ 20–24.
20 Cf. J. Esser, Grundsatz und Norm in der richterlichen Fortbildung des Privatrechts, Tübin-
gen 1964, p. 14, 141; N. Luhmann, Die Einheit des Rechtssystems, Rechtstheorie 14 (1983), p. 129; 
D.   Simon, op. cit., p. 8, 90; G. Struck, Topische Jurisprudenz, Frankfurt 1971; B. Oppermann, Die 
Rezeption des amerikanischen Rechtsrealismus durch die deutsche Topikdiskussion, Frankfurt 1985, 
pp. 6–41, 120, 134; idem, Zur Argumentation im Recht: Entscheidungsfolgen als Rechtsgründe?, 
RabelsZ 1992, p. 553.
21 U. Preuß, Sicherheit durch Recht, KritV 1989, pp. 3–4.
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The term “legal certainty” may, therefore, be used to describe a structure for the 
production of law which makes it possible for the observer to recognise rules of law 
and to use them to some extent. Thus, it should be possible to achieve propositions 
regarding the probable outcome of court proceedings – and which for a period may 
lay claim to validity. In this restricted sense, legal certainty can be spoken of as 
both a basic constitutional principle and a procedural objective22.
There remains a problem as to how to produce the certainty of the law and how 
the principle of equality can be complied with under these conditions. A potential 
solution could be either a doctrine of precedent or the application of uniform me-
thodical criteria. In German tradition, the latter, the interpretatio logica, equipped as 
it is with an appearance of scientific exactitude, has proven to be a specific variable 
in the historical context of legal development in the nineteenth century23. Legal 
thinking in systems acquired its justification by promising to bring about equality 
before the law and legal certainty and to banish arbitrariness by the use of dogmatic 
means. Guarantee for this is provided by the so-called “conceptual jurisprudence” 
(Begriffsjurisprudenz) in so far as it re-interprets conflicts into questions for legal 
reasoning and makes application of law ideal for a sequence of steps which can be 
reconstructed at any time through being linked by a chain of unbroken deduction24. 
Since the decline of philosophical idealism, the promises of systems thinking have 
come to seem no longer trustworthy. Out of this critique arose – after post-war con-
solidation – the concepts of legal “topic” and “hermeneutic”. As with the North 
American concept of “legal realism” – also conceived of as a scientific critique of 
“conceptual jurisprudence” (Begriffsjurisprudenz) – these opinions have been gaining 
in significance for some time25. The far-reaching renunciation of the belief in a body 
of law, in other words, a kind of disbandment of the conceptual system, was passed 
off as “problem thinking”. The so-called “topic” appeared as an escape from an 
unfruitful choice between natural law and legal positivism26. Its perceived function 
was to counteract the static fixing of the law. The dichotomy of problem-oriented and 
conceptual thinking, hidden behind the heading “topic”, used to be said to be the only 
truly meaningful question even for legal theory27. It should not remain unmentioned 
22 O. Weinberger, Norm und Institution. Eine Einführung in die Theorie des Rechts, Wien 1988, p. 34.
23 F. Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit, Göttingen 1996, p. 322, 458.
24 S. Simitis, Die Bedeutung von System und Dogmatik, AcP, p. 172, 131, 136.
25 F. Wieacker, Gesetzesrecht und richterliche Kunstregel, JZ 1957, p. 711.
26 H. Coing, Geschichte und Bedeutung des Systemgedankens in der Rechtswissenschaft, [in:] 
Gesammelte Aufsätze zu Rechtsgeschichte, Rechtsphilosophie und Zivilrecht, Bd. 1: 1947–1975, 
Frankfurt 1982, p. 191, 194, 206; M. Kriele, Theorie der Rechtsgewinnung, Berlin 1967, p. 114.
27 R. Zippelius, Problemjurisprudenz und Topik, NJW 1967, p. 2229; F. Wieacker, Zur prak-
tischen Leistung der Rechtsdogmatik, [in:] Hermeneutik und Dialektik II (Festschrift Gadamer), Hrsg. 
R. Bubner, Tübingen 1970, p. 311; J. Esser, Möglichkeiten und Grenzen des dogmatischen Denkens 
im modernen Zivilrecht, AcP 172 (1972), p. 97, 99, 114, 124.
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that practitioners, especially judges participated in this discussion because they saw in 
“topic” a method of understanding the object of interpretation, the law, which would 
meet the requirements of their work. However, that no-one any longer speaks about 
the “topical” or “hermeneutical” critique of legal method has done nothing since then 
to change the sweeping effect of unleashed judicial creativity in the production of law.
INTERPRETATION AND PRECEDENT
Obviously, interpretation is not just the revelation of meaning; the interpretation 
of law serves the convergence of the facts of a case and the applicable rules and is 
therefore essential in every case. In addition, as harmonised law, it must also be in 
accordance with the meaning of the EU premises. The interpretation according to 
the sense and purpose of a rule – as well named the objective-teleological method of 
interpretation – distances itself far from the law and its wording because it matches 
its subject with the purposes and aims of the statute against the background of an 
ever-changing world. At the same time, it becomes possible either to avoid or to 
eliminate any values in conflict with other parts of the legal system. Whereas the 
free form of interpretation used to be occasionally rejected, it is nowadays even 
considered to be the most elegant mode of interpretation of legal texts. Besides the 
above-mentioned advantages, it actually realises the conformity of the traditional 
body of civil law with the aims of the modern constitution as well as the direct 
unification or at least harmonization of European law.
There are, of course, certain inherent dangers in dealing freely with texts. It 
is important to establish that there is no universally acknowledged hierarchy re-
garding the various single methods of interpretation. At any rate, a certain priority 
of importance would be appropriate for the wording of a text, which results in the 
reverse conclusion that the borderline of a possible lexical meaning at the same time 
characterises the borderline between interpretation and further development of the 
law. For the German legal system, the techniques of interpretation are supposed to 
guarantee that the construction of a rule by a judge can be distinguished from the 
further development of the law. It is true that on the other side of this borderline there 
are still some methodical tools available, e.g., the analogy as well as further forms 
of the so-called “closing of legal loopholes”, though much less precise. It must not 
be underestimated that the demand for such a border is befitting for judicial activity 
within a constitutional state. In this sense, it is about whether the establishing of 
equality before the law would be best achieved under an improved system. On the 
other hand, the doctrine of equity, no matter how welcome it may be in individual 
cases, is not a suitable means for attaining this end28.
28 Cf. N. MacCormick, Z. Bankowski, op. cit.
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Precedents are not a source of law in the strict sense. In Germany, previous 
decisions of the same court or of other or higher courts are not legally binding, 
they rather provide an authoritative example for correct interpretation29. Practically, 
however, precedents at least of the Supreme Court are adopted by courts of lower 
instance. Although one might not disregard the right of the judge of lower instances 
to oppose the precedent, the appellate court system develops a factual force. Its 
practical effect comes close to the results of the common law stare decisis doctrine, 
could be analysed as a “persuasive authority”30. Its character is presumptively 
binding in the sense of a prognosis about the outcome of a judicial case.
UNIFORM INTERPRETATION OF EUROPEAN LAW
Against this background, a glance at the omnipresent import of private EU 
law might be permitted. The necessity of uniform interpretation is valued highly; 
although there are no instruments for its guarantee, except, of course, the very 
existence of the European Court and the foundation of its purpose in the European 
Treaty. An extensively employed doctrine of “direct effect” or “consistent inter-
pretation” plays an important role in the various legal systems within Europe. It 
has to a large extent a decisive influence not only on the European Court of Justice 
but on the courts of the Member States likewise31. The situation for judges of the 
European as well as of national courts who are expected to construe transformed 
European secondary law or legislation in conformity with harmonised law of the 
Member States became a commonplace32, yet, within the internal market it is the 
guarantee for equality before the law33.
29 K.P. Berger, To what extent should arbitrators respect domestic law? The German experi-
ence regarding the Law on Standard Terms, “Arbitration International” 2016, Vol. 32(2), p. 243. Cf. 
already: F. Bydlinski, Hauptpositionen zum Richterrecht, JZ 1985 3 (2002), p. 149; B. Oppermann, 
Unterlassungsanspruch…, p. 307. For Switzerland cf. W.R. Schluep, op. cit., Rn 2475–2516.
30 H. Fenge, op. cit., p. 109, 123; K.P. Berger, op. cit., p. 243, 250; B. Oppermann, Unterlassung-
sanspruch…, p. 307. Such intermediary position leaves room for further research, cf. D.F. Effer-Uhe, 
Die Bindungswirkung von Präjudizien: eine Untersuchung aus dem Blickwinkel von Prinzipientheorie 
und Fuzzy-Logik, Göttingen 2008.
31 Cf. G. Betlem, The Doctrine of Consistent Interpretation – Managing Legal Uncertainty, 
“Oxford Journal of Legal Studies” 2002, Vol. 22(3), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/22.3.397, 
p. 397; F. Müller, R. Christensen, Juristische Methodik, Bd. 2, pp. 359–415.
32 T. Stein, Richterrecht wie anderswo auch? Der Gerichtshof der Europäischen Gemeinschaften 
als „Integrationsmotor“, [in:] Richterliche Rechtsfortbildung, p. 625.
33 ECJ, 26.01.2010, Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci, stresses the matter that if a EU directive gives 
expression to a general principle (e.g., non-discrimination on the grounds of age), the principle is 
to be applied and this even in proceedings between individuals under long established national law: 
national judges must not apply any conflicting legal provisions contrary to the general principle 
expressed by the directive.
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That the interpretation of transformed EU secondary legislation should in any 
way still depend on EU directives after transformation into the law of a Member 
State, lies in the fundamental general principles of the Community, especially in 
that of the direct effect of an EU directive34, in the principle of the supremacy of 
European law35 as well as in the principle of a state being liable for damage aris-
ing out of behaviour opposed to the EU-Treaty36. Similar rights are guaranteed to 
European citizens largely by the national courts. Each of these principles obliges 
national judges to observe the intended purposes and aims of the European Union 
even when applying the law of a Member State37. This has resulted in binding 
consequences for national legal methods.
With regard to the interpretation of EU law, the judge of a Member State may 
not only use the methods of interpretation of his own legal system, he must also 
construe rules in conformity with EU standards. As a matter of procedural law, 
this proposition would not be plausible by any means; for the European Court of 
Justice assumes that national courts are autonomous both in ordinary as well as in 
summary proceedings38. But where there is autonomy of procedure, the court of 
a Member State may then operate in the usual manner even when Community law 
is being applied. This follows from the principle of lex fori.
Besides the difficulties deriving from the diversity of languages and from the 
problems of translation, there is a further problem insofar as even the national le-
gal methods display not inconsiderable differences. German methodology makes 
a strict distinction between the interpretation and the further development of law, 
which is at least maintained in theory as well as in judicial opinion. The French 
have not taken up this differentiation in quite the same way; neither did the Euro-
pean Court of Justice39.
With respect to German legal method, a further problem regarding the doctrine 
of consistent interpretation concerns the hierarchy of methods. Although recent 
German legal method had admittedly been criticised for lacking a binding element, 
the exact wording of a rule can and should normally enjoy a certain priority in 
observation. As far as the “European method” is concerned, the opposite is usually 
the case. Because there are no obligations imposed on translations of the various 
34 ECJ, Slg 1963, 1 – Van Gend & Loos. Cf. G.C.R. Iglesias, op. cit., NJW 2000, 1889, 1890.
35 ECJ, Slg 1978, 679 – Simmenthal.
36 ECJ, Slg 1991, I-5357 – Francovitch; Slg., 1996, I-1029 – Brasserie de pêcheur.
37 ECJ, 26.01.2010, Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci.
38 G.C.R. Iglesias, op. cit., NJW 2000, 1889, 1892–1894. Cf. ECJ, 26.01.2010, Case C-555/07 
Kücükdeveci.
39 R. Wank, Die Rechtsfortbildung durch den Europäischen Gerichtshof, [in:] Arbeitsgesetzge-
bung und Arbeitsrechtsprechung, Hrsg. F. von Farthmann, P. Hanau, U. Isenhardt, Berlin 1995, p. 633, 
635; W. Dänzer-Vanotti, Unzulässige Rechtsfortbildung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs, RIW 1992, 
p. 733.
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working languages of the EU, the word is not able to take central position. For 
mainly legal reasons, priority is given to the objective-teleological method, i.e., 
to the “spirit” of a directive or regulation40. The syncretism of methods of inter-
pretation has been surrendered in favour of the most inexact or even suspicious 
interpretation method of them all. Amidst the requirements of legal certainty and 
uniformity of application of the law this situation remains problematic as long as 
there is no separate theoretical basis41. As a critical consequence of this, an almost 
certainly augmented European Court of Justice sets the limits on the creation of 
law by judicial decision or precedents42, which will be neither a remedy for the 
problems outlined nor would it be to be found in comparative law.
CONCLUSIONS
German conceptual jurisprudence (Begriffsjurisprudenz) was a science in 
a purely legal sense only and as such a residue of the 19th century. Its virtue has 
been that its very existence to a large extent continues to assert the unlawfulness of 
arbitrary rules. On its part again, it acquires justification from the general postulate 
of legal certainty and therefore also from the principle of equality thereby ensuring 
equality before the law for all those who are subject to the law. The means to this 
end are re-inforced by the help of far-reaching codification and much improved 
methodical tools. In this way, the exact wording of the regulation becomes the 
hub of attention and the distinction between interpretation and the development of 
the law through judge-made law becomes easily recognisable. Acceptance of the 
thereby created “dogmatism” was achieved through the conception of a systemat-
ically comprehensive legal reconstruction of reality. Consequently, precedents are 
not a source of law in the strict sense. In Germany, previous decisions of the same 
court or of other or higher courts are not legally binding; rather they function as 
a persuasive authority.
Unfortunately, the disadvantage of this system lies in the loss of its (theoretical) 
basis. Private law has indeed developed increasingly further away from the great 
systematic statutory works of history. By way of the interpretation and development 
of the law, judicial practice has extended legal development in accordance with 
market needs and modern notions of, e.g., life in a social community or consumer 
protection.
40 T. Stein, op. cit., p. 619, 627.
41 Cf. Savigny’s idealistic conception of a system, cf. C. von Savigny, System des heutigen 
Römischen Rechts I, Berlin 1840, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111692302, p. 206.
42 K.H. Ladeur, op. cit., p. 77, passim.
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The legislator has followed suit with an increase in the amount of regulations 
outwith and independent of the systematic edifice of the German Civil Code. Eu-
ropean secondary legislation has only accelerated this process so that the national 
legislator would not be able to act any differently, even if he wanted to.
Before any potential development of a uniform European method is likely 
to happen, comparative law is offering an interim solution, albeit one that is fo-
rensically not very satisfying insofar as it lacks any binding nature necessary to 
perceive legitimacy. Over the last few decades, judicial involvement in consistent 
interpretation and further development of the law, maybe even judge-made law by 
precedents itself, has been increasing in significance. In this sense precedents and 
stare decisis are in tendency substituting the interpretatio logica in quite some 
German court practice. However, unlike the common law, continental law lacks the 
requisite methodical tools. Against this background, the continental systems would 
do well to consider using more case-law method just as the common law has turned 
more and more to the legislative rule – and not just in the wake of the assumption 
of the primary and secondary legislation of the European Union.
Perhaps in the future there will once more be a “European Common Law”, 
as there used to be before the great codification movements of the 19th century. 
Either common principles of interpretation or a new doctrine of precedents would 
be necessary to achieve this end. Though, as long as there is no European method, 
neither the case law of the European Court of Justice nor consistent interpretation 
of the courts of the Member States contribute very much towards the principles of 
equality before the law and the certainty of law.
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STRESZCZENIE
W artykule poruszono kwestię roli precedensów w niemieckiej praktyce prawniczej. W eu-
ropejskiej tradycji kontynentalnej stanowienie prawa leży w kompetencji władzy ustawodawczej, 
podczas gdy władza sądownicza polega na stosowaniu prawa. Precedens w systemie kontynentalnym 
nie stanowi źródła prawa sensu stricto, czyli formalnego źródła prawa. W systemie tym w celu za-
pewnienia jednolitości prawa, a ostatecznie – pewności prawa, sądy dokonują jednolitej interpretacji 
przepisów prawnych. Wskazać należy, że w ostatnich latach wzrosło dokonywanie przez sędziów 
spójnej interpretacji przepisów i przyczynianie się tym samym do rozwoju prawa. Oznacza to, że 
jednolita wykładnia dokonywana przez sądy może być traktowana jako precedens. W tym znaczeniu 
coraz częściej w sądach niemieckich precedens i stare decisis zastępują wykładnię logiczną.
Słowa kluczowe: precedens; słuszność prawa; niemiecki system prawny; metoda prawna; wy-
kładnia logiczna
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